Introduction
'Tell me and I forget, teach me and I remember, involve me and I learn.' These famous words of Benjamin Franklin seem to aptly capture the spirit in which Werner Güth, our hero of the occasion here, interacts with others. 1 Consider, for example, his own explanation of how he brings the implied perspective to the classroom: I teach experimental economics completely differently compared to other things, I teach it in an 'apprentice' fashion. I use learning-by-doing in small groups from the start. This is a very nice aspect of experimental economics actually.
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But Werner involves other people outside the classroom too. Browsing through his publication list, we find more co-authors than we are able to count. We know for a fact that interacting with Werner is a learning experience, and a lot of fun, not least from 1995-7 when we were on the CentER faculty at Tilburg University, which Werner often visited.
The research we report on in this chapter derives from projects we started in the Tilburg days, concerning price competition on the one hand and gender effects on the other. Our research objectives are to examine the impact on price competition of, respectively, gender and education. We shall discuss these two issues in turn.
Gender and competition
Gender gaps are observed in a variety of economic and social environments. Recent research has pointed out various differences between men * We are grateful to a referee who provided valuable comments. The research was supported by the NSF grant No. 0318378 and GIF (Gneezy) and NSF/SES-0136556 (Rustichini).
and women that may be important in economic interaction. We shall focus on a specific one: 3 when competition is introduced into an environment in which there is no gender gap in performance, the different reaction to competition by men and women might create a gap . In particular, when men and women compete in the same group of players, men exhibit more competitiveness than women. These results have been derived from contexts where winning is associated with a high payoff: for example, the experiment described in used a winner-take-all design in which the participant with the highest performance is the only one paid, and the amount won equals the total payment to subjects in the non-competitive treatment.
This evidence agrees with the general idea found in evolutionary psychology, that gender gaps derive from the different position of the genders in the reproductive process: since males can mate successfully with many different women, at small cost, they face large reproductive gains from competing intensely with other males. Females, on the other hand, can mate successfully only once per period, and thanks to the competition of males they are likely to find at least one mate. Hence their attention is not devoted so much to winning over other females, but rather to selecting the right partner.
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It is reasonable to think that the same effect (stronger competition among males) holds in environments where conditions similar to the reproductive 'game' are present: stronger competition produces a larger prize. This qualification (a larger prize for more competitive behaviour) is important, and offers an indirect test of the explanation we have just recalled. If the condition that higher competition provides a higher prize is missing, then the difference in competitive behaviour should vanish. That is, of course, unless one thinks that the preference for competition is a blind force, oblivious to the advantages (for example, in terms of reproductive fitness) that competition might provide.
To test these predictions we need a game where strong competition provides a low payoff to the winner. Such is the case in Bertrand models of price competition, where stronger competition leads to a smaller (in fact, at equilibrium, the smallest possible) prize. We use a simple Bertrand game, similar to that introduced by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) , and examine whether men and women make different choices.
Education and competition
Our second research objective concerns the impact of education. There is much interest in experimental economics concerning the impact of experience on behaviour. The most common means by which experience is obtained is by letting subjects perform some decision task many times, so that they gain familiarity with the situation. Our experiment, by contrast, may be seen as an exploration of the impact of another form of experience: experience by education.
Education may matter not only by increasing familiarity with a situation, but also by 'suggesting a solution' to the subjects. In the particular case of Bertrand price competition, the classical solution is precise and stark, eliminating competitors' profits. Perhaps educated subjects, on balance, move in that direction? The experiment comprises one session of each of two treatments, which differ in terms of whether or not the participants had been taught the theory of Bertrand oligopoly. We test whether and how this matters to behaviour.
Outline of the chapter
The chapter proceeds as follows: in the next section we describe the experimental design and specify our hypotheses. In the third section we describe the results of a first experiment, in the fourth section we present the results of a different experimental design, aimed at testing the robustness of the results and the fifth section concludes.
The Experimental Design
In this section we present (in three subsections) the game that we examine, the design of the experiment and our treatments, and finally the hypotheses we test.
The Bertrand game
The core of the experiment is the following game, similar to that introduced by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) : each one of a large (and commonly known) set of players chooses a number from the set 0 1 1000 . The player who chooses the lowest number wins as many units (Swedish kronor, in our case) as the number bid, and the others make no money.
5 If there are ties for the winning bid, these are split equally among the winners.
The game may be interpreted as a Bertrand duopoly market with price competition: the players are firms; the chosen numbers are prices; and the payoffs are profits. Admittedly, this account of real-life price competition is stylized. Yet the key feature of such interaction is present in the game: a tension between incentives for high prices that lead to high profits and incentives for low prices that undercut those of competitors.
An attractive feature of the game is its simplicity. It can easily be explained verbally to participants in an experiment without the use of complicated payoff tables.
Assuming that the competitors wish to maximize expected profit, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies, in which each competitor chooses a price of 1. There are additional Nash equilibria, in which two or more players use the weakly dominated strategy of 0, but from an economic point of view all equilibria are similar: the firms make almost no profit relative to what is available in the market.
Design and treatments
Subjects played the game described only once. The experiment consisted of two separate sessions, each conducted in two different microeconomics classes at Stockholm University. In their course the students were introduced to basic tools of game theory, a fair amount of time was spent doing or discussing experiments, and a few lectures were devoted to topics of industrial organization. The first session took place in the autumn of 2000, at the beginning of the very first lecture and before the students had had any exposure to the core topics of the course. The second session (with a different class) took place in the autumn of 2001, in the end of a lecture towards the end of the course and after the students had been introduced to the core topics. In particular, they had been taught the theory of Bertrand oligopoly.
This explains how we manipulated the level of education of the subjects. The other key feature of our design concerns the participants' gender, which we needed to record. When the experiment started, each student received an instruction (see the Appendix on page 000) describing the game. The instruction sheet informed students that participation entailed stating a 'code number' consisting of the student's initials plus the last four digits of his/her Swedish social security number. Such numbers have ten digits, specifying year-month-day of birth plus four digits where the penultimate one is even for a woman and odd for a man. Our design made crucial use of this last feature. It allowed us to separate the data according to the gender of the player. Our design generates four categories of observation, depending on the gender of a participant, and on the level of his/her education. Table 13 .1 summarizes how many observations we have for each category.
Hypotheses
In a recent line of research, and found that men react more strongly to competition incentives than do women. In particular, when men and women compete, men exhibit more competitiveness than women.
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In the price competition game, the lower the chosen prices, the fiercer is the competition in the market. If men care about winning per se more than women, we should observe significantly lower price offers from men. We test the following hypothesis: H1: Men and women choose the same prices Our second hypothesis is related to the influence of education on behaviour. One may take two perspectives on this issue. First, as explained in the beginning of the second section of this chapter, the Bertrand model makes a stark prediction that entails fierce competition and very low prices. One may thus expect that exposure to the microeconomics course moves prices downwards.
Second, education may matter simply because it helps subjects to become more familiar with a situation. In this case there would be no a priori reason to expect the prices to move in a particular direction. The null hypothesis we test is the following: H2: The same prices are chosen regardless of the level of education
Results
The two hypotheses cannot be rejected. Let us look at the details.
The distribution of prices is dispersed, although concentrated on the lower values
The mode and median for the overall sample are both 100, and the mean is 250. There is also a bump in the distribution at high values, with 7.75 per cent of the offers in the 900-1000 range. Such choices are far from equilibrium; the percentage of subjects playing the equilibrium strategy is in the overall sample is 4.93 per cent (seven subjects), with 5.5 per cent (four subjects) in the sample of non-educated subjects and 4.3 per cent (three subjects) in the sample of educated subjects.
There is no significant difference in the behaviour of subjects across gender
This conclusion holds in several different tests. The Mann-Whitney test for the overall set gives a p-value of 0.63. Even if one focuses on special subsets of the prices, the behaviour is indistinguishable: for example, there is no significant difference across genders in the proportion of subjects placing a price lower than 100 (the values are 55.1 and 54.6 for male and female subjects, respectively). The distribution of bids according to gender is presented in Figure 13 .1.
The difference across education is weak
The non-parametric tests on the price variable shows no significant difference between the two groups (of educated and non-educated subjects) (p = 0 187 for the Mann-Whitney test). But a simple analysis of the histograms seems to indicate that the prices are more concentrated among the low values for the educated group than for the non-educated. A way to study this difference is to study the distribution of a variable separating high prices and low prices (say, equal to one when the price is low, and zero otherwise). The difficulty is to find a convincing cutoff price. We observe that 54.93 per cent of the prices for the overall population are below 100, and choose this as the cutoff. One has to note, however, that different cutoffs (50 and 200) do not give a significant difference across education levels. Similarly, the upper tail (900 to 1000) does not give significant differences (p = 0 6130). If the cutoff price is chosen to be 100 (corresponding to the lowest 10 per cent) then the non-parametric analysis confirms that there is a significant difference between the frequency of low prices in the educated and non-educated population (p = 0 0301). It is interesting to note that even conditional on low (less than 100) price offers, the distribution of price across genders is not significantly different (p = 0 59 in the Mann-Whitney test). 8 Figure 13 .2 presents the bids according to the level of education. 
The gender results are robust to alternative designs
The lack of gender effects suggests that some robustness check may be warranted. We therefore ran two additional experiments checking the basic result.
Both experiments were run at the University of Minnesota in autumn 2003. The subjects were undergraduate students in economics, who had just begun to learn the basic concepts. They had no familiarity with the concept of market games, or Bertrand competition, so they would correspond to the non-educated subjects in the previous experiment. Subjects were asked to report several personal characteristics, including gender, after they had chosen the price. They did not know in advance that they were going to be asked these questions. No special incentive to answer was provided, but none of the subjects refused to answer, in either of the two experiments.
In the first group of thirty-four subjects (sixteen men and eighteen women) the design was similar to the basic design discussed earlier: subjects made simultaneous offers of prices between 0 and 100 dollars. The lowest offer was paid an amount exactly equal to the offer (that is, one dollar offered was one dollar paid), with ties split.
The distribution of price offers was concentrated at the low end. Over a range from 0 to 100, the mean was 9.14 (10.93 for men; 7.55 for women), the median 4 (5.5 for men; 4 for women) and the mode 1 (1 for men and 1 for women); 55 per cent of the offers were 4 dollars or less. The difference across gender (for example, in the in the average offer) is not statistically significant (p = 0 49 in the Mann-Whitney test that the distribution of prices of the two genders are the same).
The fact that prices are concentrated at the low end suggests that both in this experiment and in the previous one a potential gender difference might be hidden under the general pattern of low price offers. An alternative design was developed to address this potential limitation. In this design, subjects could make an offer ranging from 0 to 200 dollars. Then two out of the participants were selected randomly, and the price offers of these two subjects compared: the subject among the two with the lowest offer got a payment equal to the offer.
An experiment according to this design was again run among undergraduate students at the University of Minnesota, in a population similar to the one of the previous experiment. The sample was of 462 students (258 men and 204 women). The results according to gender are presented in Figure 13 .3.
The distribution of price offers was indeed less concentrated in the lower end: over a range from 0 to 200, the mean was 76.6 (70.8 for men; 76.6 for women), the median 75 (70.5 for men; 75 for women) and the mode 75 (75 for men and 75 for women). Only 4.7 per cent of the offers are below 8 dollars. This is a price distribution that is not concentrated on low values, so there is room for gender differences to appear. But again, the price distribution is not significantly different across genders. This is clear from the data on the mean, median and mode; moreover p = 0 20 in the Mann-Whitney test of the hypothesis that the price offer differs across genders. This game too shares the feature, although to a lesser degree, that winning is associated with low price. We conclude that there is no significant gender difference in the price offers in a simultaneous Bertrand competition game.
Discussion
The primary aim of this chapter was to test the hypothesis that different preferences in competition across genders is not likely to be present if one important condition is missing: that more competitive behaviour is more likely to gain a higher prize for the winner. This condition is clearly missing in the Bertrand games that we studied. The results show that the possibility of winning is not of itself enough to induce more competitive behaviour in male subjects.
The lack of difference in behaviour between genders in this specific experiment does not contradict the explanations that are usually provided for the more competitive behaviour of men, or the results in existing experimental literature on gender differences in competition. Competition there (for example in is understood as the differential performance in a task where effort and talent have to be provided. The outcome in the task might then be interpreted (at least by the subject who is informed of this outcome) as a social signal of skill or talent. In the present experiment, although the interaction between the subjects is 'competitive', the information about personal talent is absent. In addition, the winner in this game gets the lowest possible prize, so competition does not appear to be a way of selecting a winner, but rather a sucker who (although earning slightly more than other participants) is willing to take such small bait.
An important gender issue has been left open by the present study, and should be a subject of future research. Genders may differ with respect to the degree of risk aversion (see, for example, Eckel and Grossman, 2003) . A subject in our game is choosing a price facing the price distribution induced by the other players. The results of the experiment justify a belief that this price distribution is not concentrated near the equilibrium (price equal to 1). Let p be the probability that the lowest price among the opponents' prices is larger than p, so that is decreasing. The choice of a price is the choice among a set of lotteries indexed by p, where the p lottery gives a prize equal to p with probability p , and a prize of 0 dollars with probability 1 − p . (This avoids the possibility of tied winners, at price p + 1.) Consider now two subjects, one man and one woman, who have the same belief about the price distribution. If the woman is less competitive but more risk averse, she might choose the same price as the man, because the effect of preference for competition and risk aversion go in opposite ways. While it seems unlikely that the two effects balance so precisely in the different populations we have tested, to produce behaviour that only looks the same, further analysis of these two characteristics is important.
A second aim of our chapter was to examine the effect of economic education on behaviour. This effect is, as we have seen, more subtle than the effects of gender. Education has some effect: low prices (with respect to the cutoff of 100) are significantly more frequent after education than they were before. Subjects who have been told the theory of Bertrand competition, and who have thus been made aware of the idea that there will be cut-throat price competition, choose somewhat lower prices. In this way, education seems to bring subjects closer to the prediction of the Nash equilibrium concept. But this effect is weak, if anything. In addition, this effect is the same across genders.
Against the backdrop of this result, in closing this chapter we connect again to the issue concerning the difference between teaching and involving. We have shown that education may have very little effect on behaviour in a price-competition context. By contrast, it is well known that, if subjects interact over and over again in such games, then behavior tends to change over time.
9 This difference is indicative that being taught and being involved implies different forms of experience, just as Franklin said.
Money will be paid out as follows: One of the participants who has chosen the lowest number will win as many kronor as the number he/she chose. The participant to be paid will be determined by a random draw. Those participants who do not choose the lowest number will not receive any money.
The person who wins money should contact the experimenter in his office before 20 October 2000, and the money will then be paid.
You participate in the experiment by responding to and handing in the following: Güth (2002) , an interview with Fredrik Andersson and Håkan Holm. 3 Among those gender gaps we do not focus on, let us mention that in some situations women are more risk-averse than men (for a survey, see Eckel and Grossman, 2003) . For a more popular discussion of differences between men and women, and the evolutionary reasons for these, see Pinker (2002) . 4 For a modern exposition of the view of evolutionary psychology on this point, see Daly and Wilson (2001) or Buss (1999) . 5 At the time of the experiment, there were approximately ten kronor to the euro, or to the dollar. 6 For example, a person with social security number 440202-5678 must be male. The technique has been used previously by Dufwenberg and Muren (2000) . The winner of the game was entitled to private payment by visiting Martin Dufwenberg' s office during the following weeks. However, the winner's code number was publicly announced in class. This implies that the degree of anonymity between subjects was relatively low. A code number does not automatically reveal identity, but with some effort one might be able to work this out. 7 While we base our hypothesis on the results of the previous studies, the design there was different in many aspects from the current design. For example, in this chapter, subjects do not make real effort, but rather choose a number. Still there is a cost associated with each choice: a more competitive choice corresponds to a lower payoff. 8 Our finding of a weak effect of education accords with results discussed by Rubinstein (1999, pp. 156, 167-8) (obtained in collaboration with six graduate students) where 'the responses of economics students to daily strategic situations before and after a course in game theory' showed little difference. 9 See Plott (1989) or Holt (1995) for surveys on experimental IO that cover the topic, or Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) , who show this to be a game similar to that studied here.
